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Abstract
We provide a uni￿ed treatment of alternative models of information acquisition/transmission
that have been advanced to rationalize price dispersion in online and o› ine markets for homo-
geneous products. These di⁄erent frameworks￿ which include sequential search, ￿xed sam-
ple search, and clearinghouse models￿ reveal that reductions in (or the elimination of) con-
sumer search costs need not reduce (or eliminate) price dispersion. Our treatment highlights
a ￿duality￿ between search-theoretic and clearinghouse models of dispersion, and shows how
auction-theoretic tools may be used to simplify (and even generalize) existing theoretical re-
sults. We conclude with an overview of the burgeoning empirical literature. The empirical
evidence suggests that price dispersion in both online and o› ine markets is sizeable, pervasive,
and persistent￿ and does not purely stem from subtle di⁄erences in ￿rms￿products or services.
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11 Introduction
Simple textbook models of competitive markets for homogeneous products suggest that all-out
competition among ￿rms will lead to the so-called ￿law of one price.￿Yet, empirical studies spanning
more than four decades (see Tables 1a and 1b) reveal that price dispersion is the rule rather than the
exception in many homogeneous product markets. The observation that the prices di⁄erent ￿rms
charge for the same product often di⁄er by 30 percent or more led Hal Varian to suggest that ￿the
￿ law of one price￿is no law at all￿(Varian, 1980, p. 651). This chapter provides a uni￿ed treatment
of several theoretical models that have been developed to explain the price dispersion observed
in homogeneous product markets, and surveys the burgeoning empirical literature (including the
studies summarized in Tables 1a and 1b) which documents ubiquitous price dispersion. A key
motivation for this chapter is to dispel the erroneous view that the Internet￿ through its facilitation
of dramatic declines in consumer search costs￿ will ultimately lead to the ￿law of one price.￿
When confronted with evidence of price dispersion, many are quick to point out that even in
markets for seemingly homogeneous products, subtle di⁄erences among the ￿services￿o⁄ered by
competing ￿rms might lead them to charge di⁄erent prices for the same product. Nobel Laureate
George Stigler￿ s initial response to wags making this point was philosophical: ￿... [While] a portion
of the observed dispersion is presumably attributable to such di⁄erence[s]...it would be metaphys-
ical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to heterogeneity￿ (Stigler, 1961, p. 215).
Thirty-￿ve years later, the literature has amassed considerable support for Stigler￿ s position. As
we shall see in Sections 2 and 3, there is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that much (and
in some markets, most) of the observed dispersion stems from information costs￿ consumers￿costs
of acquiring information about ￿rms, and/or ￿rms￿costs of transmitting information to consumers.
As Figure 1 reveals, research on information, search, and price dispersion has become increas-
ingly important since the publication of Stigler￿ s seminal article on the Economics of Information.
Until about 1998, most studies focused on environments where consumers incur a positive cost of
obtaining each additional price quote. Search costs in these studies consist of consumers￿oppor-
tunity cost of time in searching for lower prices (so-called ￿shoe-leather￿costs), plus other costs
associated with obtaining price quotes from competing ￿rms (such as the incremental cost of the
postage stamps or phone calls used in acquiring price information from ￿rms). Consumers in these
environments weigh the cost of obtaining an additional price quote against the expected bene￿ts of
searching an additional ￿rm. As we discuss in Section 2.1, equilibrium price dispersion can arise in
2these environments under a variety of market conditions and search strategies (including sequential
and ￿xed sample search).
While marginal search costs are useful in explaining price dispersion in some markets, in many
online markets incremental search costs are very low￿ and in some cases, zero. For example, price
comparison sites and shopbot technologies create environments where consumers may obtain a
list of the prices that di⁄erent sellers charge for the same product. Despite the fact that this
information is available to consumers in seconds, ultimately at the cost of a single ￿mouse click,￿
the overwhelming empirical ￿nding is that even in these environments, price dispersion is pervasive
and signi￿cant￿ the law of one price is egregiously violated online. In Section 2.2, we examine
an alternative line of theoretical research where marginal search costs are not the key driver for
price dispersion. Our theoretical analysis concludes in Section 2.3 with a discussion of alternative
behavioral rationales for price dispersion (including bounded rationality on the part of ￿rms and/or
consumers).
Section 3 provides a more detailed overview of the growing empirical literature. As one might
suspect based on the trend in Figure 1 and the research summarized in Tables 1a and 1b, most
empirical studies of price dispersion post-date the Internet and rely on online data. Our view
is that this is more an artifact of the relative ease with which data may be collected in online
markets￿ not an indication that price dispersion is more important (or more prevalent) in online
than o› ine markets. For this reason, we have attempted to provide a balanced treatment of the
literatures on online and o› ine price dispersion. As we shall argue, the overwhelming conclusion
of both literatures is that price dispersion is not purely an artifact of product heterogeneities.
2 Theoretical Models of Price Dispersion
This section presents alternative models that have been used to rationalize the price dispersion ob-
served in both o› ine and online markets. One approach is to assume that it is costly for consumers
to gather information about prices. In these ￿search-theoretic￿models, consumers searching for the
best price incur a positive cost of obtaining each additional price quote. Representative examples
include Stigler (1961), Rothschild (1973), Reinganum (1979), MacMinn (1980), Braverman (1980),
Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob (1985), Stahl (1989, 1996), Dana (1994),
McAfee (1995), Janssen and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2004), as well as Janssen, Moraga-GonzÆlez, and
Wildenbeest (2005).
3A second approach deemphasizes the marginal search cost as a source for price dispersion.
Instead, consumers access price information by consulting an ￿information clearinghouse￿(e.g., a
newspaper or an Internet price comparison site); e.g. Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Shilony (1977),
Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), Spulber (1995), Baye and Morgan (2001),
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004a).1 The distinguishing feature of ￿clearinghouse models￿ is
that a subset of consumers gain access to a list of prices charged by all ￿rms and purchase at the
lowest listed price. In the earliest of these models, equilibrium price dispersion stems from ex ante
heterogeneities in consumers or ￿rms. For example, in the Varian and Salop-Stiglitz models, some
consumers choose to access the clearinghouse to obtain price information, while others do not. In
Shilony, Rosenthal, and Narasimhan, some consumers are loyal to a particular ￿rm (and thus will
buy from it even if it does not charge the lowest price), while other consumers are ￿shoppers￿and
only purchase from the ￿rm charging the lowest price. Spulber (1995) shows that equilibrium price
dispersion arises even when all consumers can costlessly access the clearinghouse￿ provided each
￿rm is privately informed about its marginal cost. Baye and Morgan (2001) o⁄er a clearinghouse
model that endogenizes not only the decisions of ￿rms and consumers to utilize the information
clearinghouse (in the previous clearinghouse models, ￿rms￿listing decisions are exogenous), but also
the fees charged by the owner of the clearinghouse (the ￿information gatekeeper￿ ) to consumers
and ￿rms who wish to access or transmit price information. They show that a dispersed price
equilibrium exists even in the absence of any ex ante heterogeneities in consumers or ￿rms.
In this section, we provide an overview of the key features and ideas underlying these literatures.
2.1 Search-Theoretic Models of Price Dispersion
We begin with an overview of search-theoretic approaches to equilibrium price dispersion. The
early literature stresses the idea that, when consumers search for price information and search is
costly, ￿rms will charge di⁄erent prices in the market. There are two basic sorts of models used:
Models with ￿xed sample size search and models where search is sequential. We will discuss each
of these in turn.
1A third approach deemphasizes consumer search and mainly focuses on whether price dispersion can arise when
consumers ￿passively￿ obtain price information directly from ￿rms (as in direct mail advertisements); cf. Butters
(1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stegeman (1991), Robert and Stahl (1993), McAfee (1994), and Stahl (1994).
A related marketing literature examines similar issues, ranging from loyalty and price promotion strategies to channel
con￿ icts and the Internet; see Lal and Villas-Boas (1998), Lal and Sarvary (1999), Raju, Srinivasan, and Lal (1990),
and Rao, Arjunji and Murthi (1995).
4The search models considered in this subsection are all based on the following general envi-
ronment. A continuum of price-setting ￿rms (with unit measure) compete in a market selling an
identical (homogeneous) product. Firms have unlimited capacity to supply this product at a con-
stant marginal cost, m: A continuum of consumers is interested in purchasing the product. Let
the mass of consumers in the market be ￿; so that the number of customers per ￿rm is ￿: Each
consumer has a quasi-linear utility function, u(q) + y, where q is the quantity of the homogeneous
product and y is the quantity of some numeraire good whose price is normalized to be unity. This
implies that the indirect utility of a consumer who pays a price p per unit of the product and who
has an income of M is
V (p;M) = v (p) + M
where v (￿) is nonincreasing in p: By Roy￿ s identity, note that the demand for the product of
relevance is q (p) ￿ ￿v0 (p).
To acquire the product, a consumer must ￿rst obtain a price quote from a store o⁄ering the
product for sale. Suppose that there is a search cost, c, per price quote.2 If, after obtaining n price
quotes, a consumer purchases q (p) units of the product from one of the ￿rms at price p per unit,
the consumer￿ s (indirect) utility is
V = v (p) + M ￿ cn
The analysis that follows focuses on posted price markets where consumers know the distribution
of prices but do not know the prices charged by particular stores.3
2.1.1 The Stigler Model
Stigler (1961) considers the special case of this environment where:
1. Each consumer wishes to purchase K ￿ 1 units of the product; that is, q (p) = ￿v0 (p) = K;
2. The consumer￿ s search process is ￿xed sample search￿ prior to searching, consumers deter-
mine a ￿xed sample size, n; of ￿rms from whom to obtain price quotes and then buy from
2In what follows, we assume that consumers have identical search costs. Axell (1977) o⁄ers a model of price
dispersion with heterogeneous search costs.
3This assumption is relaxed in Rothschild (1974), Benabou and Gertner (1993) and Dana (1994), where buyers
learn about the distribution of prices as they search, and in Rauh (1997), where buyers￿search strategies depend
on only ￿nitely many moments of the distribution of prices. Daughety (1992) o⁄ers an alternative search-theoretic
model of equilibrium price dispersion that results from informational asymmetries and a lack of price precommitment
on the part of ￿rms.
5the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price; and





Stigler assumes that a consumer chooses a ￿xed sample size, n, to minimize the expected total
cost (expected purchase cost plus search cost) of purchasing K units of the product:
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where the second equality obtains from integration by parts. Notice that the term in square brackets
re￿ ects the expected purchase price, which is a decreasing function of the sample size, n. However,
since each additional price observation costs c > 0 to obtain, an optimizing consumer will choose
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From this, Stigler concludes that dispersion in both posted prices and transactions prices arises as
a consequence of costly search.
How do transactions prices and search intensity relate to the quantity of the item being pur-
chased (or equivalently, to the frequency of purchases)?4 Stigler￿ s model o⁄ers sharp predictions in
this dimension. Note that the expected bene￿t to a consumer who increases her sample size from




















4K may be related to purchase frequency as follows. Suppose prices are ￿valid￿for T periods, and the consumer
wishes to buy one unit every t ￿ T periods; that is, t represents a consumer￿ s purchase frequency. Then the total
number of units purchased during the T periods is K ￿ T=t: Thus, an increase in purchase frequency (t) is formally
equivalent to an increase in K in the model above.
6which is decreasing in n. Furthermore, the expected bene￿t from search are greater for products
bought in greater quantities or more frequently; that is, equation (1) is increasing in K: Since
the cost of the nth search is independent of K while the expected bene￿t is increasing in K; it
immediately follows that the equilibrium search intensity, n￿; is increasing in K: That is, consumers
obtain more price quotes for products they buy in greater quantities (or frequencies).
Despite the fact that the Stigler model assumes each individual inelastically purchases K units of
the product, a version of the ￿law of demand￿holds: Each ￿rm￿ s expected demand is a nonincreasing
function of its price. To see this, note that a ￿rm charging price p is visited by ￿n￿ consumers
and o⁄ers the lowest price with probability (1 ￿ F (p))
n￿￿1 : Thus, a representative ￿rm￿ s expected
demand when it charges a price of p is
Q(p) = ￿n￿K (1 ￿ F (p))
n￿￿1 (2)
which is decreasing in p:
The Stigler model implies that both the expected transactions price (Proposition 1) as well as
the expected total costs inclusive of search costs (Proposition 2 ) are lower when prices are more
dispersed (in the sense of a mean preserving spread).5
Proposition 1 Suppose that a price distribution G is a mean preserving spread of a price distri-
bution F. Then the expected transactions price of a consumer who obtains n > 1 price quotes is
strictly lower under price distribution G than under F:
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5G is a mean preserving spread of F if (a)
R 1
￿1 [G(p) ￿ F (p)]dp = 0 and (b)
R z
￿1 [G(p) ￿ F (p)]dp ￿ 0; with
strict inequality for some z: Note that (a) is equivalent to the fact that the means of F and G are equal. Together,
the two conditions imply that F and G cross exactly once (at the mean) on the interior of the support.
7Since G is a mean preserving spread of F; there exists a unique interior point u￿ = F (EF [P])
such that F￿1 (u￿) = G￿1 (u￿): Further, for all u < u￿;F￿1 (u) ￿ G￿1 (u) > 0 and for all u >
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where the last equality follows from the fact that F and G have the same mean.
Proposition 2 Suppose that an optimizing consumer obtains more than one price quote when
prices are distributed according to F, and that price distribution G is a mean preserving spread of
F. Then the consumer￿ s expected total costs under G are strictly less than those under F:
Proof. Suppose that, under F; the optimal number of searches is n￿: Then the consumer￿ s expected
total cost under F is













￿ K ￿ cn￿
￿ E [CG]
where the strict inequality follows from Proposition 1, and the weak inequality follows from the
fact that n￿ searches may not be optimal under the distribution G:
At ￿rst blush, it might seem surprising that consumers engaged in ￿xed sample search pay lower
average prices and have lower expected total costs in environments where prices are more dispersed.
The intuition, however, is clear: In environments where prices are more dispersed, the prospects
for price improvement from search are higher because the left tail of the price distribution￿ the
part of the distribution where ￿bargains￿are to be found￿ becomes thicker as prices become more
dispersed.
82.1.2 The Rothschild Critique and Diamond￿ s Paradox
While Stigler o⁄ered the ￿rst search-theoretic rationale for price dispersion, the model has been
criticized for two reasons. First, as pointed out in Rothschild (1973), the search procedure assumed
in Stigler￿ s model may not be optimal. In ￿xed sample search, consumers commit to a ￿xed number,
n, of stores to search and then buy at the lowest price at the conclusion of that search. A clear
drawback to such a strategy is that it fails to incorporate new information obtained during search,
such as an exceptionally low price from an early search. Indeed, once the best price quote obtained
is su¢ ciently low, the bene￿t in the form of price improvement drops below the marginal cost of
the additional search. As we will see below, sequential search results in an optimal stopping rule
such that a consumer searches until she locates a price below some threshold, called the reservation
price. Second, the distribution of prices, F; is exogenously speci￿ed and is not based on optimizing
￿rm behavior. In fact, in light of equation (2), a representative ￿rm with constant marginal cost
of m enjoys expected pro￿ts of
￿ (p) = (p ￿ m)Q(p):
That is, absent any cost heterogeneities, each ￿rm faces exactly the same expected pro￿t func-
tion. Why then, would ￿rms not choose the same pro￿t-maximizing price or, more generally, how
could the distribution of prices generated by pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms be consistent with the price
distribution over which consumers were searching? In short, Rothschild pointed out that it is far
from clear that information costs give rise to an equilibrium of price dispersion with optimizing
consumers and ￿rms; in Stigler￿ s model, only one side of one market, the consumers, are acting in
an optimizing fashion consistent with equilibrium. For this reason, Rothschild criticized the early
literature for its ￿partial-partial equilibrium￿approach.
Diamond (1971) advanced this argument even further￿ he essentially identi￿ed conditions under
costly search where the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies involves all ￿rms charging
the same price￿ the monopoly price. Diamond￿ s result may be readily seen in the following special
case of our environment where:
1. Consumers have identical downward sloping demand, i.e. ￿v00 (p) = q0 (p) < 0;
2. Consumers engage in optimal sequential search;
3. A ￿rm acting as a monopoly would optimally charge all consumers the unique monopoly
price, p￿; and
94. A consumer who is charged the monopoly price earns surplus su¢ cient to cover the cost of
obtaining a single price quote; that is v (p￿) > c:
In this environment, all ￿rms post the monopoly price and consumers visit only one store,
purchase at the posted price p￿; and obtain surplus v (p￿) ￿ c > 0. Given the stopping rule of
consumers, each ￿rm￿ s best response is to charge the monopoly price; given that all ￿rms charge
p￿, it is optimal for each consumer to search only once. To see that this is the unique equilibrium
in undominated strategies, suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in which some ￿rm
posted a price below the monopoly price (clearly, pricing above the monopoly price is a dominated
strategy). Let p0 be the lowest such posted price. A ￿rm posting the lowest price could pro￿tably
deviate by raising its price to the lower of p￿ or p0 + c: Any consumer visiting that ￿rm would
still rationally buy from it since the marginal bene￿t of an additional search is smaller than c￿ the
marginal cost of an additional search. Thus, such a ￿rm will not lose any customers by this strategy
and will raise its earnings on each of these customers.
The Diamond paradox is striking: even though there is a continuum of identical ￿rms competing
in the model￿ a textbook condition for perfect competition￿ in the presence of any search frictions
whatsoever the monopoly price is the equilibrium. Rothschild￿ s criticism of the Stigler model,
along with the Diamond paradox, spawned several decades of research into whether costly search
could possibly generate equilibrium price dispersion ￿ a situation where consumers are optimally
gathering information given a distribution of prices, and where the distribution of prices over which
consumers are searching is generated by optimal (pro￿t-maximizing) decisions of ￿rms.
2.1.3 The Reinganum Model and Optimal Sequential Search
Reinganum (1979) was among the ￿rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise in a
sequential search setting with optimizing consumers and ￿rms. Reinganum￿ s result may be seen in
the following special case of our environment where:
1. Consumers have identical demands given by ￿v0 (p) = q (p) = Kp", where " < ￿1 and K > 0;
2. Consumers engage in optimal sequential search;
3. Firms have heterogeneous marginal costs described by the atomless distribution G(m) on
[m;m];
104. A consumer who is charged the monopoly price by a ￿rm with the highest marginal cost, m;







Reinganum shows that, under these assumptions, there exists a dispersed price equilibrium
in which ￿rms optimally set prices and each consumer engages in optimal sequential search. To
establish this, we ￿rst show how one derives the optimal reservation price in a sequential search




that is atomless, except possibly at p: Consumers engage in optimal sequential search with free
recall. If, following the nth search, a consumer has already found a best price z ￿ min(p1;p2;:::;pn);









where the second equality obtains through integration by parts. Using Leibnitz￿rule, we have
B0 (z) = ￿v0 (z)F (z)
= Kz"F (z) > 0 (3)
Thus, the expected bene￿ts from an additional search are lower when the consumer has already
identi￿ed a relatively low price. Since search is costly (c > 0), consumers must weigh the expected
bene￿ts against the cost of an additional search. The expected net bene￿ts of an additional search
are
h(z) ￿ B (z) ￿ c
If the expected bene￿ts from an additional search exceed the additional cost, h(z) > 0; it is
optimal for the consumer to obtain an additional price quote. If h(z) < 0, the consumer is better
o⁄ purchasing at the price z than obtaining an additional price quote.
A consumer￿ s optimal sequential search strategy may be summarized as follows:
Case 1. h(p) < 0 and
R p
p v (p)dF (p) < c: Then the consumer￿ s optimal strategy is to not
search.
Case 2. h(p) < 0 and
R p
p v (p)dF (p)dp ￿ c: Then the consumer￿ s optimal strategy is to search
until she obtains a price quote at or below the reservation price, r = p:
11Case 3. h(p) ￿ 0: Then the consumer￿ s optimal strategy is to search until she obtains a price




(v (p) ￿ v (r))dF (p) ￿ c = 0 (4)
Equation (4) represents a price at which a consumer is exactly indi⁄erent between buying and





= ￿c < 0, h(p) ￿ 0, and h0 (z) = B0 (z) > 0: A consumer who observes a price that
exceeds r will optimally ￿reject￿ that price in favor of continued search, while a consumer who
observes a price below r will optimally ￿accept￿that price and stop searching.
Case 1 is clearly not economically interesting as it leads to the absence of any market for the
product in the ￿rst place. Case 2 arises when the expected utility of purchasing the product exceeds
the cost of an initial search, but the distribution of prices is su¢ ciently ￿tight￿relative to search
costs to make additional searches suboptimal. Most of the existing search literature, including
Reinganum, restricts attention to Case 3, as we shall do hereafter.
The reservation price de￿ned in equation (4) has several interesting comparative static prop-











Thus, an increase in search costs leads to a higher reservation price: Other things equal, the range
of ￿acceptable￿prices is greater for products with higher search costs. Note that, for the special
case when q (r) = 1; dr=dc = 1=F (r) > 1: In this case, a one unit increase in search costs increases
the range of acceptable prices by more than one unit￿ that is, there is a ￿magni￿cation e⁄ect￿of
increases in search costs.6
Reinganum avoids Rothschild￿ s criticism and the ￿Diamond paradox￿by introducing ￿rm cost
heterogeneities. Since each ￿rm j di⁄ers in its marginal costs, mj; prices will di⁄er across ￿rms
even when they price as monopolists.
Suppose that a fraction 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 of ￿rms price above r and recall that there are ￿ consumers










if pj ￿ r
0 if pj > r
6In general, there may be either a magni￿cation or an attenuation e⁄ect of a one unit increase in the cost of search.
12Ignoring for a moment the fact that a ￿rm￿ s demand is zero if it prices above r; note that pro￿t-
maximization implies the ￿rst-order condition
￿







Standard manipulation of the ￿rst-order condition for pro￿t-maximization implies that ￿rm j￿ s







Suppose that ￿rms simply ignore the consumer￿ s reservation price, r; and price at this markup.
This would imply that consumers face a distribution of posted prices ^ F (p) = G(p(1 + ")=") on the
interval [m"=(1 + ");m"=(1 + ")]. Given this distribution of prices, optimizing consumers would




(v (p) ￿ v (r))d ^ F (p) ￿ c = 0
Furthermore, if r < m"=(1 + "); ￿rms charging prices in the interval (r;m"=(1 + ")] would enjoy
no sales. Since the elasticity of demand is constant, ￿rms that would maximize pro￿ts by pricing
above r in the absence of consumer search ￿nd it optimal to set their prices at r when consumers
search.7 Thus, the distribution of prices, ^ F (p); is inconsistent with optimizing behavior on the
part of ￿rms. In fact, given the reservation price r; optimizing behavior on the part of ￿rms would





^ F (p) if p < r
1 if p = r
To establish that this is, in fact, an equilibrium distribution of prices one must verify that
consumers facing this ￿truncated￿distribution of prices have no incentive to change their reservation








(v (p) ￿ v (r))d ^ F (p) +
h
1 ￿ ^ F (r)
i




(v (p) ￿ v (r))d ^ F (p) ￿ c = 0
7Reinganum assumes that m ￿ m"=(1 + "), which guarantees that ￿rms who would otherwise price above r ￿nd
it pro￿table to price at r.
13where the last equality follows from the fact that r is the optimal reservation price when consumers
face the price distribution ^ F: In short, Reinganum￿ s assumptions of downward sloping demand and
cost heterogeneity give rise to an equilibrium of price dispersion with optimizing consumers and
￿rms.
Note that downward sloping demand and cost heterogeneities together play a critical role in
generating equilibrium price dispersion in this environment. To see that both assumptions are
required, suppose ￿rst that costs are heterogeneous but that each consumer wished to purchase
one unit of the product, valued at v. In this case, given a reservation price of r ￿ v, all ￿rms
would ￿nd it optimal to price at r; and the distribution of prices would be degenerate. Of course,
a reservation price of r < v is inconsistent with optimizing behavior on the part of consumers. To
see this, suppose that a consumer was unexpectedly presented with a price p0 = r+￿; where ￿ < c:
According to the search strategy, such a consumer is supposed to reject this price and continue
searching; however, the bene￿t from this additional search is less than the cost. Thus, a consumer
should optimally accept a price p0 rather than continuing to search. The upshot of this is that the
only equilibrium reservation price is r = v: However, these are precisely the conditions given in
Case 1; hence the only equilibrium is where no consumers shop at all.8
If demand were downward sloping but ￿rms had identical marginal costs of m, each ￿rm would
have an incentive to set the same price, p￿ = minfr;m"=(1 + ")g; given the reservation price.
This leads back to Case 2 and one obtains the Diamond paradox: All ￿rms charge the monopoly
price, p￿ = m"=(1 + "). Indeed, in the environment above, a limiting case where the distribution
of marginal costs converges to a point is exactly the Diamond model.
Finally, we examine how the variance in the distribution of posted (and transactions) prices
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8Carlson and McAfee (1983) show that if one introduces heterogeneities in consumer search costs, a dispersed
price equilibrium may exist provided that individual consumers have perfectly inelastic (in contrast to downward
sloping) demand.
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with strict inequality if r < m"=(1 + "): Thus, we have:
Conclusion 1 In the Reinganum model, a reduction in search costs decreases the variance of
equilibrium prices.
As we will see below, however, this is not a general property of search-theoretic models of price
dispersion.
2.1.4 Remarks on Fixed versus Sequential Search
It is useful to highlight some key di⁄erences between sequential and ￿xed sample size search. With
sequential search, the number of searches is a random variable from a geometric distribution, and




In contrast, with ￿xed sample size search, consumers commit up front to n searches. Both types
of search have advantages and disadvantages, and indeed Morgan and Manning (1985) have shown
that both types of search can be optimal in di⁄erent circumstances. The key advantage of sequential
search is that it allows a searcher to economize on information costs ￿the decision-maker weighs
the expected bene￿ts and costs of gathering additional price information after each new price quote
is obtained. If an acceptable price is obtained early on, the expected gains from additional searches
are small and there is no need to pay the cost of additional searches. The primary advantage of
￿xed-sample size search is that it allows one to gather information quickly. Consider, for instance,
a ￿rm that requires raw materials by the end of the week. If it takes a week for a raw materials
vendor to provide a price quote, sequential search would permit the ￿rm to obtain only a price
quote from a single vendor. In this case, ￿xed sample size search is optimal￿ the ￿rm commits to
obtain quotes from n vendors, where n is chosen by the ￿rm to minimize expected costs as outlined
above in our discussion of the Stigler model.
152.1.5 The MacMinn Model
In light of the fact that there are instances in which ￿xed sample size search is optimal, one may
wonder whether equilibrium price dispersion can arise in such a setting. MacMinn (1980) provides
an a¢ rmative answer to this question. MacMinn￿ s result may be seen in the following special case
of our environment where:
1. Consumers have unit demand with valuation v;
2. Consumers engage in optimal ￿xed sample search; and9
3. Firms have privately observed marginal costs described by the atomless distribution G(m)
on [m;m], where m < v:
At the time, MacMinn derived equilibrium pricing by solving a set of di⁄erential equations under
the special case where G is uniformly distributed. However, subsequent to his paper, a key ￿nding
of auction theory, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981) was developed.10 Using the
revenue equivalence theorem, we can generalize MacMinn￿ s results to arbitrary cost distributions.
To see this, notice that when consumers optimally engage in a ￿xed sample search consisting
of n￿ ￿rms, each ￿rm e⁄ectively competes with n￿ ￿ 1 other ￿rms to sell one unit of the product.
Of these n￿ ￿rms, the ￿rm posting the lowest price wins the ￿auction￿ .
Using the revenue equivalence theorem, one can show that the expected revenues to a ￿rm with
marginal cost m in any ￿auction￿where the ￿rm charging the lowest price always wins and the
￿rm with the highest marginal cost earns zero surplus is






In the MacMinn model, expected revenues are simply a ￿rm￿ s posted price, p(m), multiplied by
the probability it charges the lowest price, which, in equilibrium, is (1 ￿ G(m))
n￿￿1 : Using the fact
that R(m) = p(m)(1 ￿ G(m))
n￿￿1, substituting into equation (5); and solving for p(m) yields
the equilibrium pricing strategy of a ￿rm with marginal cost m when consumers sample n￿ ￿rms:








9MacMinn also provides a version of the model that is valid for optimal sequential search.
10See Klemperer (1999) for a non-technical survey of auction theory including the revenue equivalence theorem.
McAfee and McMillan (1988) establishes an equivalence between search and auctions in a mechanism design context.
16Notice that, after integration by parts, we can rewrite equation (6) to obtain the familiar formula












min is the lowest of n￿ ￿ 1 draws from the distribution G:







Notice that the equilibrium pricing strategy gives rise to a distribution of posted prices, F (p),
induced by the distribution of costs; that is
F (p) = G(p(m))










where the expression E
￿
B(n)￿
, as previously de￿ned in equation (1) when K = 1, is the expected
bene￿t from increasing the number of price quotes obtained from n￿1 to n: As in the Stigler model,
a reduction in search costs increases the optimal sample size n￿ (so that consumers optimally sample
more ￿rms).
Thus, MacMinn shows that, provided search costs are low enough, a dispersed price equilibrium
exists. This not only leads to ex post di⁄erences in consumers￿information sets (di⁄erent consumers
sample di⁄erent ￿rms and so observe di⁄erent prices), but induces a degree of competition among
￿rms (since they are competing against at least one other ￿rm, whose cost they do not know). As
in the Reinganum model, the level of price dispersion depends on the dispersion in ￿rms￿costs.














where n￿ is the optimal number of searches by consumers and ￿2
m is the variance in ￿rm￿ s costs.
Two interesting results emerge from the model. First, the variance in prices increases as the
variance in ￿rms￿marginal costs increases. This result is intuitive. Somewhat counterintuitively,
17note that as the sample size increases, the variance in equilibrium prices increases. This implies
that, taking into account the interaction between consumers and ￿rms in this ￿xed-sample size
search model, dispersion varies inversely with search costs.
Conclusion 2 In the MacMinn model, a reduction in search costs increases the variance of equi-
librium prices.
This conclusion is in contrast to Conclusion 1, where precisely the opposite implication is
obtained in the Reinganum sequential search model. This highlights an important feature of search-
theoretic models of price dispersion: Depending on the model, a reduction in search costs may be
associated with higher or lower levels of price dispersion. In the Reinganum model, a reduction
in search costs reduces the reservation price of consumers and thus induces marginal ￿high-cost￿
￿rms to reduce their prices from their monopoly price to the reservation price. Since the monopoly
prices of low-cost ￿rms are below the reservation price, their prices remain unchanged; lower search
costs thus reduce the range of prices. In the MacMinn model, lower search costs induce consumers
to sample more ￿rms before purchasing￿ in e⁄ect, each ￿rm competes with more rivals. As a
consequence, the optimal amount of ￿bid shading￿(pricing above marginal cost) is reduced, thus
increasing the level of price dispersion.
2.1.6 The Burdett and Judd Model
Burdett and Judd (1983) were the ￿rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise in a
search-theoretic model with ex ante identical consumers and ￿rms.11 Burdett and Judd￿ s main
result may be seen in the following special case of our environment where:
1. Consumers have unit demand up to a price v;
2. Consumers engage in optimal ￿xed sample search;12
3. Each ￿rm has constant marginal cost, m; and would optimally charge all consumers the
unique monopoly price, p￿ = v; and
4. A consumer who is charged the monopoly price earns surplus su¢ cient to cover the cost of
11Janssen and Moraga-GonzÆlez (2004) provide an oligopolistic version of the Burdett and Judd model.
12Burdett and Judd also provide a version of the model that is valid under optimal sequential search.
18obtaining a single price quote:13
In the Burdett and Judd model, an equilibrium consists of a price distribution F (p) (based on
optimal pricing decisions by ￿rms) and an optimal search distribution < ￿n >1
n=1, where < ￿n >1
n=1
is the distribution of the number of times a consumer searches in the population. Thus, ￿i is the
probability that a consumer searches (or alternatively, the fraction of consumers that search) exactly
i ￿rms. If ￿1 = 1; then all consumers sample only one ￿rm. If ￿1 = 0; then all consumers sample at
least two ￿rms, and so on. Consumers purchase from the ￿rm sampled that o⁄ers the lowest price.
We begin by studying optimal search on the part of consumers given a price distribution F (p):

















as in the Stigler model. Moreover, the expected bene￿t schedule is strictly decreasing in n: Thus,









First consider the case where all consumers obtain two or more price quotes; that is, where
￿1 = 0: In this case, the optimal pricing strategy on the part of ￿rms is to price at marginal cost
(the Bertrand paradox) since each ￿rm is facing pure price competition with at least one other
￿rm and all ￿rms are identical. Of course, if all ￿rms are pricing at marginal cost, then it would
be optimal for a consumer to sample only one ￿rm, which contradicts the hypothesis that ￿1 = 0.
Thus, we may conclude that, in any equilibrium ￿1 > 0:
Next, consider the case where consumers all obtain exactly one price quote. In that case, each
￿rm would optimally charge the monopoly price, p￿ = v: Hence, ￿1 6= 1 in any dispersed price
equilibrium.
From these two arguments it follows that, in any dispersed price equilibrium, ￿1 2 (0;1). In
light of the fact that consumers￿expected bene￿ts from search are decreasing in the sample size, it
13These assumptions are satis￿ed, for example, when
q (p) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if p < v
1 ￿
p￿v
￿ if v ￿ p ￿ v + ￿
0 if p > v + ￿
and ￿ > c=2:
19follows that a consumer must be indi⁄erent between obtaining one price quote and obtaining two


















Thus, in any dispersed price equilibrium, ￿1;￿2 > 0 while ￿i = 0 for all i > 2: Let ￿1 = ￿ and
￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿:
We are now in a position to characterize an atomless dispersed price equilibrium. First, note
that since ￿ 2 (0;1); there is a positive probability that a ￿rm faces no competition when it sets
its price. Thus, if ￿rm i charges the monopoly price, it earns expected pro￿ts of
E [￿ijpi = v] = (v ￿ m) ￿ ￿￿
In contrast, a ￿rm choosing some lower price ￿wins￿when its price is below that of the other ￿rm
a consumer has sampled. Thus, if ￿rm i charges a price pi ￿ v; it earns expected pro￿ts of
E [￿ijpi ￿ v] = (pi ￿ m) ￿ ￿(￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F(pi)))
Thus, for a given distribution of searches, equilibrium price dispersion requires that the distribution
of ￿rm prices, F (￿); satis￿es











which is a well-behaved atomless cumulative distribution having support [m + ￿(v ￿ m);v].
Finally, it remains to determine an equilibrium value of ￿: Since each consumer must be indif-






Notice that, when ￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1; E
￿
B(2)￿
= 0 while E
￿
B(2)￿
> 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1): Burdett
and Judd show that E
￿
B(2)￿
is quasi-concave; thus, when c is su¢ ciently low, there are generically
two dispersed price equilibria￿ one involving a relatively high fraction of consumers making two
searches, the other with a relatively low fraction of consumers.14
14There is a non-dispersed price equilibrium where all consumers search once and all ￿rms charge the monopoly
price.
20To summarize, Burdett and Judd show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise even when
all ￿rms and consumers are ex ante identical. In the equilibrium price distribution, all ￿rms charge
positive markups. A fraction ￿ of consumers do not comparison shop￿ they simply search at one
store and purchase. The remaining fraction of consumers are ￿shoppers￿ ￿ these consumers search
at two stores and buy from whichever o⁄ers the lower price.
2.2 Models with an ￿Information Clearinghouse￿
In search-theoretic models, consumers pay an incremental cost for each additional price quote they
obtain. These models are relevant, for example, when consumers must visit or phone traditional
sellers in order to gather information about prices. They are also relevant in online environments
where consumers must search the websites of individual retailers to gather information about the
prices they charge.
An alternative class of models is relevant when a third party ￿ an information clearinghouse
￿ provides a subset of consumers with a list of prices charged by di⁄erent ￿rms in the market.
Examples of this environment include newspapers which display prices di⁄erent stores charge for
the same product or service and online price comparison sites.
In this section we provide a general treatment of clearinghouse models, and show that these
models are surprisingly similar to those that arise under ￿xed sample size search. One of the key
modeling di⁄erences is that clearinghouse models tend to be oligopoly models; thus, there is not a
continuum of ￿rms in such settings.
Where possible, we shall use the same notation as in the previous section; however, for reasons
that will become clear when we compare clearinghouse models with the search models presented
above, we now let n denote the number of ￿rms in the market. The general treatment that follows
relies heavily on Baye and Morgan (2001) and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004a).
Consider the following general environment (which we will specialize to cover a variety of di⁄er-
ent models). There is a ￿nite number, n > 1; of price-setting ￿rms competing in a market selling
an identical (homogeneous) product. Firms have unlimited capacity to supply this product at a
constant marginal cost, m: A continuum of consumers is interested in purchasing the product. This
market is served by a price information clearinghouse. Firms must decide what price to charge for
the product and whether to list this price at the clearinghouse. Let pi denote the price charged by
￿rm i: It costs a ￿rm an amount ￿ ￿ 0 if it chooses to list its price. All consumers have unit demand
21with a maximal willingness to pay of v > m:15 Of these, a mass, S > 0, of the consumers are price-
sensitive ￿shoppers.￿These consumers ￿rst consult the clearinghouse and buy at the lowest price
listed there provided this price does not exceed v. If no prices are advertised at the clearinghouse
or all listed prices exceed v, then a ￿shopper￿visits one of the ￿rms at random and purchases if its
price does not exceed v. A mass L ￿ 0 of consumers per ￿rm purchase from that ￿rm if its price
does not exceed v. Otherwise, they do not buy the product at all.
It can be shown that if L > 0 or ￿ > 0, equilibrium price dispersion arises in the general
model￿ provided of course that ￿ is not so large that ￿rms refuse to list prices at the clearinghouse.
More precisely,
Proposition 3 Let 0 ￿ ￿ < n￿1
n (v ￿ m)S. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium of the general
clearinghouse model:
1. Each ￿rm lists its price at the clearinghouse with probability





























3. If a ￿rm does not list its price at the clearinghouse, it charges a price equal to v:
4. Each ￿rm earns equilibrium expected pro￿ts equal to




Proof. First, observe that if a ￿rm does not list its price at the clearinghouse, it is a dominant
strategy to charge a price of v:
Next, notice that ￿ 2 (0;1] whenever
n￿
(n ￿ 1)(v ￿ m)S
< 1:
15 Baye and Morgan (2001) consider an environment with downward sloping demand.
22This condition holds, since ￿ < n￿1
n (v ￿ m)S:
Notice that p0 > m; provided that L > 0 or ￿ > 0: In this case, it can be shown that F is a
well-de￿ned, atomless cdf on [p0;v]. When L = 0 and ￿ = 0, notice that p0 = m. In this case, the
symmetric equilibrium distribution of prices is degenerate, with all ￿rms pricing at marginal cost
(the Bertrand paradox outcome).
Next, we show that, conditional on listing a price, a ￿rm can do no better than pricing according
to F: It is obvious that choosing a price above or below the support of F is dominated by choosing
a price in the support of F: A ￿rm choosing a price p in the support of F earns expected pro￿ts of
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Using the binomial theorem, we can rewrite this as:














where we have substituted for F to obtain the second equality. Since a ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts are
constant on [p0;v], it follows that the mixed pricing strategy, F; is a best response to the other
n ￿ 1 ￿rms pricing based on F:
When ￿ = 0; it is a weakly dominant strategy to list. It remains to show that when ￿ > 0 and
￿ 2 (0;1), a ￿rm earns the same expected pro￿ts regardless of whether it lists its price. But a ￿rm
that does not list earns expected pro￿ts of












which equals the expected pro￿ts earned by listing any price p 2 [p0;v]. ￿
We are now in a position to examine the many well-known clearinghouse models that emerge
as special cases of this general environment.
2.2.1 The Rosenthal Model
Rosenthal (1980) was among the ￿rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise in a
clearinghouse environment when some consumers have a preference for a particular ￿rm. Under
his interpretation, each ￿rm enjoys a mass L of ￿loyal￿consumers. Rosenthal￿ s main results may
be seen in the following special case of the general clearinghouse model:
231. It is costless for ￿rms to list prices on the clearinghouse: ￿ = 0 and;
2. Each ￿rm has a positive mass of loyal consumers: L > 0:
Since ￿ = 0; it follows from Proposition 3 that ￿ = 1; that is, all of the n ￿rms advertise their
prices with probability one. Using this fact and Proposition 3, the equilibrium distribution of prices
is










p0 = m + (v ￿ m)
L
L + S
The price dispersion arising in the Rosenthal model stems from exogenous di⁄erences in the prefer-
ences of consumers. While shoppers view all products as identical and purchase at the lowest listed
price, each ￿rm is endowed with a stock of L loyals. The equilibrium price dispersion arises out of
the tension created by these two types of consumers. Firms wish to charge v to extract maximal
pro￿ts from the loyal segment, but if all ￿rms did so a ￿rm could slightly undercut this price and
gain all of the shoppers. One might imagine that this ￿undercutting￿argument would lead to the
Bertrand outcome. However, once prices get su¢ ciently low, a ￿rm is better o⁄ simply charging
v and giving up on attracting shoppers. Thus, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies￿ ￿rms
randomize their prices, sometimes pricing relatively low to attract shoppers and other times pricing
fairly high to maintain margins on loyals.
It is interesting to examine the equilibrium transactions prices in the market. Loyal customers





while shoppers expect to pay the lowest of n draws from F (p); that is, the expected transaction















min (p) is the cdf associated with the lowest of n draws from F:
How do transactions prices vary with the number of competing ￿rms? Rosenthal￿ s striking
result is that, as the number of competing ￿rms increases, the expected transactions prices paid by
all consumers go up. As we shall see below, the result hinges on Rosenthal￿ s assumption that entry
24brings more loyals into the market. Indeed, the fraction of shoppers in the market is S=(S + nL)
and it may readily be seen that as n becomes large, shoppers account for an increasingly small
fraction of the customer base of ￿rms. As a consequence, the incentives to compete for these
customers is attenuated and prices rise as a result. The key is to recognize that increases in n
change the distribution of prices, and this e⁄ect as well as any order statistic e⁄ect associated with
an increase in n must be taken into account.
Formally, notice that the equilibrium distribution of prices, F; is stochastically ordered in n:
That is, the distribution of prices when there are n + 1 ￿rms competing ￿rst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of prices where there are n ￿rms competing. This implies that the
transactions prices paid by loyals increase in n. To show that the transactions prices paid by
shoppers also increase in n requires a bit more work; however, one can show that the same stochastic
ordering obtains for the cdf F
(n)
min (p):
Finally, it is useful to note the similarity between the Rosenthal version of the clearinghouse
model and the search-theoretic model of Burdett and Judd. In Burdett and Judd, even though
there is a continuum of ￿rms, each consumer only samples a ￿nite number of ￿rms (one or two).
Further, in Burdett and Judd, a ￿xed fraction of consumers per ￿rm, ￿￿; sample only a single
￿rm. In e⁄ect, these consumers are ￿loyal￿to the single ￿rm sampled while the fraction (1 ￿ ￿)￿
of customers sampling two ￿rms are ￿shoppers￿ ￿ they choose the lower of the two prices. For this
reason, when n = 2 in the Rosenthal model, the equilibrium price distribution given in equation
(11) is identical to equation (10) in the Burdett and Judd model (modulo relabeling the variables
for loyals and shoppers).
2.2.2 The Varian Model
Varian (1980) was among the ￿rst to show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise in a clear-
inghouse environment when consumers have di⁄erent ex ante information sets.16 Varian interprets
the S consumers as ￿informed consumers￿and the L consumers as ￿uninformed￿consumers. Thus
a mass, S; of consumers choose to access the clearinghouse while others, the mass L per ￿rm, do
not. Varian￿ s main result may be seen in the following special case of the general clearinghouse
model:
1. It is costless for ￿rms to list prices on the clearinghouse: ￿ = 0; and
16Png and Hirshleifer (1987), as well as Baye and Kovenock (1994), extend the Varian model by allowing ￿rms to
also engage in price matching or ￿beat or pay￿advertisements.
252. The total measure of ￿uninformed￿consumers lacking access to the clearinghouse is U > 0;
hence, each ￿rm is visited by L = U
n of these consumers.
Again, since ￿ = 0; it follows that ￿ = 1 and hence all n ￿rms advertise their prices at the
clearinghouse: Using this fact and setting L = U=n in Proposition 3, the equilibrium distribution
of prices is
















The fact that this atomless distribution of prices exists whenever there is an exogenous fraction
of consumers who do not utilize the clearinghouse raises the obvious question: Can this equilibrium
persist when consumers are making optimal decisions? Varian shows that the answer to this
question is yes ￿ provided di⁄erent consumers have di⁄erent costs of accessing the clearinghouse.
The easiest way to see this is to note that the value of information provided by the clearinghouse is







not, E [p]; that is;







where V OI denotes the value of (price) information contained at the clearinghouse. Suppose
consumers face a cost of accessing the information provided by the clearinghouse. Note that this
cost is essentially a ￿xed cost of gaining access to the entire list of prices, not a per price cost as in the
search-theoretic models considered above. Varian assumes that the cost to type S and L consumers
of accessing the clearinghouse is ￿S and ￿L, with ￿S < ￿L. Then provided ￿S ￿ V OI(n) < ￿L
type S consumers will optimally utilize the clearinghouse while the type L consumers will not.
In short, if di⁄erent consumers have di⁄erent costs of accessing the clearinghouse, there exists
an equilibrium of price dispersion with optimizing consumers and ￿rms. In such an equilibrium,
informed consumers pay lower average prices than uninformed consumers.
It is important to emphasize that, when one endogenizes consumers￿decisions to become in-
formed in the Varian model, the level of price dispersion is not a monotonic function of consumers￿
information costs. When information costs are su¢ ciently high, no consumers choose to become
informed, and all ￿rms charge the ￿monopoly price,￿v. When consumers￿information costs are
zero, all consumers choose to become informed, and all ￿rms price at marginal cost in a symmetric
26equilibrium￿ the Bertrand paradox. Thus, for su¢ ciently high or low information costs, there is no
price dispersion; for moderate information costs, prices are dispersed on the nondegenerate interval
[p0;v]. A similar result obtains in Stahl (1989), which is related to Varian as follows. Stahl assumes
a fraction of consumers have zero search costs and, as a consequence, view all ￿rms￿prices and
purchase at the lowest price in the market. These consumers play the role of S in Varian￿ s model
(informed consumers). The remaining fraction of consumers correspond to the L￿ s in the Varian
model, but rather than remaining entirely uninformed, these consumers engage in optimal sequen-
tial search in presence of positive incremental search costs. Stahl shows that when all consumers
are shoppers, the identical ￿rms price at marginal cost and there is no price dispersion. When no
consumers are shoppers, Diamond￿ s paradox obtains and all ￿rms charge the monopoly price. As
the fraction of shoppers varies from zero to one, the level of dispersion varies continuously￿ from
zero to positive levels, and back down to zero.
Conclusion 3 In general, price dispersion is not a monotonic function of consumers￿information
costs or the fraction of ￿shoppers￿in the market.
How does the number of competing ￿rms a⁄ect transactions prices? In the Rosenthal model,
we saw that increased ￿competition￿led to higher expected transactions prices for all consumers.
In the Varian model, in contrast, the e⁄ect of competition on consumer welfare depends on whether
or not the consumer chooses to access the clearinghouse. Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (forthcoming)
show that as n increases, the competitive e⁄ect predictably leads to lower average transaction prices
being paid by informed consumers. However, the opposite is true for uninformed consumers￿ as
the number of competing ￿rms increases, ￿rms face reduced incentives to cut prices in hopes of
attracting the ￿shoppers￿and, as a consequence, the average price charged by a ￿rm, which is also
the average price paid by an uninformed consumer, increases. If one views the clearinghouse as
representing access to price information on the Internet, then one can interpret the price e⁄ect as one
consequence of the so-called ￿digital divide;￿see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2003). Consumers
with Internet access are made better o⁄ by sharper online competition while those without such
access are made worse o⁄.
2.2.3 The Baye and Morgan Model
All of the above models assume that it is costless for ￿rms to advertise their prices at the clear-
inghouse. Baye and Morgan (2001) point out that, in practice, it is generally costly for ￿rms to
27advertise their prices and for consumers to gain access to the list of prices posted at the clear-
inghouse. For example, newspapers charge ￿rms fees to advertise their prices and may choose to
charge consumers subscription fees to access any posted information. The same is true of many
online environments. Moreover, the clearinghouse is itself an economic agent, and presumably has
an incentive to endogenously choose advertising and subscription fees to maximize its own expected
pro￿ts. Thus, Baye and Morgan examine the existence of dispersed price equilibria in an environ-
ment with optimizing consumers, ￿rms, and a monopoly ￿gatekeeper￿who controls access to the
clearinghouse.
Speci￿cally, Baye and Morgan consider a homogeneous product environment where n identical,
but geographically distinct, markets are each served by a (single) local ￿rm. Distance or other
transaction costs create barriers su¢ cient to preclude consumers in one market from buying this
product in another market; thus each ￿rm in a local market is a monopolist. Now imagine that
an entrepreneur creates a clearinghouse to serve all markets. In the Internet age, one can view
the clearinghouse as a virtual marketplace ￿through its creation, the gatekeeper expands both
consumers￿and ￿rms￿opportunities for commerce. Each local ￿rm now has the option to pay the
gatekeeper an amount ￿ to post a price on the clearinghouse in order to gain access to geographically
disparate consumers. Each consumer now has the option to pay the gatekeeper an amount ￿ to
shop at the clearinghouse and thereby purchase from ￿rms outside the local market.
The monopoly gatekeeper ￿rst sets ￿ and ￿ to maximize its own expected pro￿ts. Given these
fees, pro￿t maximizing ￿rms make pricing decisions and determine whether or not to advertise
them at the clearinghouse. Similarly, consumers optimally decide whether to pay ￿ to access the
clearinghouse. Following this, a consumer can simply click her mouse to research prices at the
clearinghouse (if she is a subscriber), visit the local ￿rm, or both. With this information in hand,
a consumer decides whether and from whom to purchase the good.
Baye and Morgan show that the gatekeeper maximizes its expected pro￿ts by setting ￿ su¢ -
ciently low that all consumers subscribe, and charging ￿rms strictly positive fees to advertise their
prices. Thus, Baye and Morgan￿ s main results may be seen in the following special case of the
general clearinghouse model:
1. The gatekeeper optimally sets positive advertising fees: ￿ > 0 and;
2. The gatekeeper optimally sets subscription fees su¢ ciently low such that all consumers access
the clearinghouse; that is, L = 0:
28Under these conditions, using Proposition 3, we obtain the following characterization of equilib-
rium ￿rm pricing and listing decisions: Each ￿rm lists its price at the clearinghouse with probability


























When a ￿rm does not list its price, it charges a price equal to v; and each ￿rm earns equilibrium





Notice that n￿ represents the aggregate demand by ￿rms for advertising and is a decreasing
function of the fee charged by the gatekeeper. Prices advertised at the clearinghouse are dispersed
and strictly lower than unadvertised prices (v).
Several features of this equilibrium are worth noting. First, equilibrium price dispersion arises
with fully optimizing consumers, ￿rms, and endogenous fee-setting decisions on the part of the
clearinghouse ￿despite the fact that there are no consumer or ￿rm heterogeneities and all consumers
are ￿fully informed￿in the sense that, in equilibrium, they always purchase from a ￿rm charging the
lowest price in the global market. Second, while equilibrium price dispersion in the Varian model
is driven by the fact that di⁄erent consumers have di⁄erent costs of accessing the clearinghouse,
Baye and Morgan show that an optimizing clearinghouse will set its fees su¢ ciently low that all
consumers will rationally access the clearinghouse. Equilibrium price dispersion arises because of
the gatekeeper￿ s incentives to set strictly positive advertising fees. Strikingly, despite the fact that
all consumers use the gatekeeper￿ s site and thus purchase at the lowest global price, ￿rms still
earn positive pro￿ts in equilibrium. In expectation, these pro￿ts are proportional to the cost, ￿; of
accessing the clearinghouse.
Conclusion 4 In the Baye and Morgan model, equilibrium price dispersion persists even when it
is costless for all consumers to access the information posted at the gatekeeper￿ s site. Indeed, price
dispersion exists because it is costly for ￿rms to transmit price information (advertise prices) at the
gatekeeper￿ s site.
29Why does the gatekeeper ￿nd it optimal to set low (possibly zero) fees for consumers wishing
to access information, but strictly positive fees to ￿rms who wish to transmit price information?
Baye and Morgan point out that this result stems from a ￿free rider￿problem on the consumer
side of the market that is not present on the ￿rm side. Recall that the gatekeeper can only extract
rents equal to the value of the outside option of ￿rms and consumers. For each side of the market,
the outside option consists of the surplus obtainable by not utilizing the clearinghouse. As more
consumers access the site, the number of consumers still shopping locally dwindles and the outside
option for ￿rms is eroded. In contrast, as more ￿rms utilize the clearinghouse, vigorous price
competition among these ￿rms reduces listed prices and leads to a more valuable outside option
to consumers not using the clearinghouse. Thus, to maximize pro￿ts, the gatekeeper optimally
subsidizes consumers to overcome this ￿free rider problem￿while capturing rents from the ￿rm side
of the market. No analogous ￿free rider problem￿arises on the ￿rm side; indeed greater consumer
participation at the clearinghouse increases the frequency with which ￿rms participate (￿ increases)
and hence permits greater rent extraction from ￿rms.
2.2.4 Models with Asymmetric Consumers
In general, little is known about the general clearinghouse model with asymmetric consumers.17
However, for the special case of two ￿rms, results are available. Narasimhan (1988) analyzes the
case where there are two ￿rms, one of whom has more loyal customers than the other, and where
the cost of listing at the clearinghouse is zero. He shows that the unique equilibrium involves mixed
strategies in which the ￿rm with more loyal customers prices less aggressively than its rival. As a
result, the rival (with fewer loyals) earns equilibrium pro￿ts that exceed the pro￿ts it would earn
by exclusively serving its loyal customers at the monopoly price. The ￿rm with more loyals, in
contrast, earns equilibrium pro￿ts that equal the pro￿ts it could earn by exclusively serving its
loyal customers at the monopoly price. Interestingly, shoppers are harmed by these asymmetries ￿
they pay, on average, higher prices than would be the case were the loyal customers divided equally
between the ￿rms. Further theoretical work on clearinghouse models with consumer asymmetries
and positive listing fees would be a useful addition to the literature.
17For speci￿c clearinghouse models, some results are available. For instance, Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1992)
characterize all equilibria in a version of the Varian model in which ￿rms have asymmetric numbers of consumers.
302.2.5 Cost Heterogeneities and the Spulber Model
Spulber (1995) considers a situation where consumers have access to the complete list of prices and
buy from the ￿rm o⁄ering the lowest price. Of course, in such a setting, if ￿rms were identical one
would immediately obtain the Bertrand outcome. To generate price dispersion, Spulber examines
the situation where ￿rms have heterogeneous costs and consumers have downward sloping demand.
However, the main economic intuition underlying the model may be seen through the following
adaptation of our general clearinghouse framework for the unit demand case:
1. All consumers are shoppers: S > 0 and L = 0;
2. There is no cost to advertise prices on the clearinghouse: ￿ = 0; and
3. Firms have privately observed marginal costs described by the atomless distribution G(m)
on [m;m]:
Since there are no costs to advertise prices, all ￿rms list prices on the clearinghouse. Each ￿rm
faces competition from n ￿ 1 other ￿rms with random marginal costs. Since the ￿rm charging the
lowest price wins the entire market, ￿rms are e⁄ectively competing in an auction in which their
own costs are private information. For the special case of unit demand, the equilibrium price for a












min is the lowest of n ￿ 1 draws from the distribution G:
There are several noteworthy features of this equilibrium. First, equilibrium ￿rm pricing entails
positive markups despite the fact that all consumers are ￿shoppers￿ and have a complete list
of prices. Intuitively, there is a trade-o⁄ between lowering one￿ s price to attract shoppers and
the pro￿tability of this price. In equilibrium, this results in a markup which depends on the
number of competing ￿rms. As the number of ￿rms grows large, the equilibrium markup becomes
small. Second, notice that cost heterogeneity leads to equilibrium price dispersion despite the fact
consumers are identical and all consumers are purchasing at the lowest price.
It is interesting to compare the Spulber model, which occurs in the clearinghouse framework,
with the search-theoretic framework of MacMinn. Notice that, when the number of competing
￿rms in Spulber, n, is equal to the optimal ￿xed sample size for consumers in the MacMinn model,
n￿; the equilibrium distribution of prices, equations (13) and (7), are identical in the two models.
31That is, cost heterogeneities are su¢ cient to generate price dispersion in oligopoly models where
all consumers obtain complete price information, as well as in models where a continuum of ￿rms
compete but each consumer only obtains price quotes from a ￿nite number n of these ￿rms.
2.3 Bounded Rationality Models of Price Dispersion
Several recent papers have emphasized that bounded rationality can also lead to price dispersion.
The idea is to relax the Nash equilibrium assumption ￿which requires that each decision maker
in the market is choosing an action (be it a price or a search strategy) that is a best response to
given actions of other market participants. Two equilibrium concepts ￿quantal response equilib-
rium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and epsilon equilibrium (Radner, 1980)￿are particularly useful
because they nest the standard Nash equilibrium concept as a special case.
In a quantal response equilibrium (QRE), the likelihood that a particular ￿rm sets a speci￿c
price depends on the expected pro￿ts arising from that price (see Lopez-Acevedo, 1997). A ￿rm￿ s
price is determined by a stochastic decision rule, but prices leading to higher expected pro￿ts are
more likely to be charged. Of course, each ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts from di⁄erent pricing decisions
depend on the probability distributions of other players￿prices. A QRE requires that all ￿rms hold
correct beliefs about the probability distributions of other players￿actions. The nondegenerate
distributions of prices resulting in a QRE may be viewed as shocks to ￿rms￿ pro￿t functions.
Alternatively, nondegenerate price distributions might stem from decision errors by ￿rms. Such
errors may arise from limitations in managers￿cognitive processing abilities or ￿bugs￿in dynamic
pricing algorithms used by Internet retailers.
In an "-equilibrium, the prices charged by each ￿rm are such that no ￿rm can gain more than
" in additional pro￿ts by changing its price. Such an equilibrium may arise because of cognitive
or motivational constraints on the part of ￿rms. For example, if it is costly to reprogram dynamic
pricing algorithms, managers may not be willing to incur these economic or psychic costs when the
resulting gain is small (less than ").
Recently, Baye and Morgan (2004) applied QRE and "-equilibrium concepts to pricing games
and showed that only a little bounded rationality is needed to generate the patterns of price
dispersion documented in laboratory experiments as well as observed on Internet price comparison
sites. In a similar vein, Rauh (2001) shows that price dispersion can arise when market participants
make small but heterogeneous mistakes in their beliefs about the distribution of prices. Ellison
(2005) provides a more detailed treatment of recent advances along these lines.
322.4 Concluding Remarks: Theory
Despite a slow start, there are now a variety of models that can be used to rationalize equilibrium
price dispersion in online and o› ine markets. We conclude our theoretical discussion with the
following general observations:
1. There is not a ￿one-size-￿ts-all￿model of equilibrium price dispersion; di⁄erent models are
appropriate for analyzing di⁄erent market environments. For instance, search-theoretic mod-
els are most appropriate for analyzing environments where consumers must visit di⁄erent
stores or ￿rms￿websites to gather price information. Clearinghouse models are appropriate
when consumers are able to access a list of prices (for example, in a newspaper or at a price
comparison site).
2. The distribution of prices is determined by the interaction of all market participants￿ ￿rms,
consumers and, in the case of clearinghouse models, information gatekeepers. As a conse-
quence, the level of price dispersion depends on the structure of the market ￿the number of
sellers, the distribution of costs, consumers￿elasticities of demand, and so on.
3. Reductions in search costs may lead to either more or less price dispersion, depending on
the market environment. Furthermore, the elimination of consumer search costs need not
eliminate price dispersion.
4. Depending on the market environment, heightened competition (increases in the number of
￿rms) can increase or decrease the level of dispersion. Moreover, in some models, heightened
competition of this form leads to higher transactions prices paid by all consumers. In other
models, the e⁄ect of increased competition on the welfare of consumers depends on which
side of the ￿digital divide￿a consumer resides.
5. Price dispersion is not purely an artifact of ex ante heterogeneities in ￿rms or consumers.
While di⁄erences in ￿rms￿costs or base of loyal consumers (stemming from ￿rms￿brand-
ing e⁄orts, di⁄erential service qualities, or reputations) can contribute to equilibrium price
dispersion, such di⁄erences are not necessary for equilibrium price dispersion.
6. Thanks to the Internet, information gatekeepers are playing an increasingly important role
in the economy. In their attempt to maximize pro￿ts and enhance the value of information
33provided by their sites, information gatekeepers have an incentive to charge fees for their
services that induce equilibrium price dispersion.
7. A little bounded rationality goes a long way in explaining price dispersion.
3 Empirical Analysis of Price Dispersion
We now turn to the empirical literature on price dispersion. In Section 3.1, we discuss some of
the strengths and weaknesses of commonly used metrics for measuring price dispersion in online
and o› ine markets. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the empirical literature, and highlights
empirical evidence suggesting that information costs (either on the consumer or ￿rm side of the
market) contribute to price dispersion; that is, dispersion is not purely an artifact of subtle product
heterogeneities.
3.1 Measuring Price Dispersion
The equilibrium models of price dispersion presented above each imply non-degenerate distributions




. Given such a distribution, a standard measure of dispersion
is the variance in prices. For each model of equilibrium price dispersion, this measure can be directly
computed. For instance, in the MacMinn model, if ￿rms have uniformly distributed marginal costs,
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Notice that one is then in a position to test comparative static predictions of the model using this
measure. In a similar manner, expressions for the variance in prices may be derived from the other
models previously presented.
A number of authors use the sample variance to measure price dispersion (e.g., Pratt, Wise,
and Zeckhauser (1979) and Ancarani and Shankar (2004)). The obvious advantage is that it uses
all available data. A drawback of this measure is apparent when comparing dispersion across
products or over time. For instance, suppose that, during an in￿ ationary period, the marginal
costs of all ￿rms in the MacMinn model increased by a factor ￿ > 1: In that case, the new variance
would simply scale up the original variance by a factor ￿2: Thus, this measure of price dispersion
would change even though the underlying real economics of the situation are the same after the
in￿ ationary period.
34For this reason, if one wishes to compare levels of price dispersion either across di⁄erent products
or across time, one must standardize the data in some fashion. An alternative is to use the coe¢ cient
of variation, CV = ￿p=E [p] (or its sample analogue), which is homogenous of degree zero in the
level of prices. The CV is particularly useful when comparing levels of price dispersion over long
periods of time (e.g., Scholten and Smith (2002) and Eckard (2004)) or across di⁄erent products
(e.g., Carlson and Pescatrice (1980); Sorensen (2000); Aalto-Set￿l￿ (2003); and Baye, Morgan and
Scholten (2004a,b)). An added advantage is that, unlike some methods of standardization, the
coe¢ cient of variation may preserve the comparative static predictions of the model of interest.
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One may verify that this statistic is, like the variance, decreasing in search costs, but, unlike the
variance, this statistic does not change with a multiplicative shift in ￿rms￿costs.
Another widely used measure of price dispersion is the (sample) range; see, for instance, Pratt,










Given the equilibrium distribution of prices implied by a particular theoretical model, comparative
static predictions about changes in the range are possible based on the behavior of the highest

















Unfortunately, all of the above measures of price dispersion su⁄er from a potential theoretical
defect. Suppose that n > 2 ￿rms compete in a classical homogeneous product Bertrand setting.
Under standard conditions there will exist a unique symmetric equilibrium where all ￿rms price at
marginal cost. But in addition, there are asymmetric equilibria where two ￿rms price at marginal
cost and the remaining n ￿ 2 ￿rms price strictly above marginal cost. Thus, price dispersion
18To facilitate comparisons across di⁄erent products or over time, it is sometimes useful to normalize the range by
dividing it by the minimum or average price; see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004b) and Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000).
35can arise in a classical Bertrand environment. Yet, the apparent price dispersion is arguably not
economically relevant because the unique transactions price is marginal cost.
To remedy this theoretical defect, Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004a) propose a measure called
￿the gap,￿ which they de￿ne to be the di⁄erence between the two lowest prices in the market.
Letting p
(n)







The classical Bertrand model (as well as textbook models of perfect competition) implies that the
gap between the two lowest prices is zero in any equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise). All of
the oligopoly models of price dispersion discussed above, in contrast, imply a positive gap. An
additional property of the gap is that it gives greater weight to low prices, which, in the absence
of quantity data, one might reasonably assume lead to more sales than higher prices. The key
disadvantage, shared by the range, is that it relies purely on extreme values of the data. Hence,
the range and gap are more sensitive to outliers and other forms of ￿noise￿than measures that use
all the available data, such as the sample variance and coe¢ cient of variation.
In addition to these measures, the value of information (V OI) de￿ned earlier in equation (12)
can also be used as a gauge of dispersion. This measure, which is simply the di⁄erence between the
average observed price and the lowest observed price, is zero in the absence of any price dispersion
but otherwise positive. The principal advantage of this measure of dispersion is that it has a very
intuitive interpretation: Its value indicates the amount of money a consumer saves by purchasing
at the best price rather than from a randomly selected ￿rm in the market.
3.2 Price Dispersion in the Field
If price dispersion stems from frictions related to the acquisition and transmission of information (as
implied by the models in Section 2) rather than subtle di⁄erences in ￿rms￿service levels, observed
levels of dispersion should systematically depend on ￿environmental factors￿present in the models.
For example, in his seminal article on the economics of information, George Stigler, advanced the
following hypotheses:
19As with the range, one can perform comparative static analyses for any of the theoretical models using the
expected gap, and it is sometimes useful to normalize the gap by dividing by the lowest price. In this formulation, the
gap represents the di⁄erence between the two lowest prices expressed as a percentage of the lowest price realization.
36￿...dispersion itself is a function of the average amount of search, and this in turn is
a function of the nature of the commodity:
1. The larger the fraction of the buyer￿ s expenditures on the commodity, the greater
the savings from search and hence the greater the amount of search.
2. The larger the fraction of repetitive (experienced) buyers in the market, the
greater the e⁄ective amount of search (with positive correlation of successive prices).
3. The larger the fraction of repetitive sellers, the higher the correlation between
successive prices, and hence, the larger the amount of accumulated search.
4. The cost of search will be larger, the larger the geographic size of the market.￿
Stigler (1961, p. 219).
Stigler￿ s hypotheses o⁄er a useful guide for understanding the empirical literature on price
dispersion. Much of this literature tests Stigler￿ s hypotheses by examining whether search intensity
(proxied by variables that a⁄ect the bene￿ts and costs of search) is correlated with levels of price
dispersion. As we have seen, however, when one takes Rothschild￿ s criticism into account, an
increase in search intensity can lead to increases or decreases in the level of equilibrium price
dispersion, depending on the model. Thus, one challenge for empirical researchers is choosing a
model that closely approximates the ￿data generating￿ environment. A second challenge is to
control for factors outside of the model that might in￿ uence levels of dispersion. A third challenge
arises because ￿rm optimization is absent in Stigler￿ s model, but is clearly present in the data.
For this reason, a number of empirical studies look beyond Stigler￿ s hypotheses to test hypotheses
derived from speci￿c search-theoretic or clearinghouse models of equilibrium price dispersion. We
provide a broad overview of these and related strands of the literature below.
3.2.1 Dispersion and the ￿Bene￿ts￿of Search
The search-theoretic models presented in Section 2 imply that search intensity depends, in part,
on the consumer￿ s demand for a product. In the Stigler model, demand is represented by the
parameter, K. The greater is K; the greater the expected bene￿ts of search and hence the greater
the search intensity. Stigler￿ s ￿rst two hypotheses are based on the notion that the share of an
item in a consumer￿ s overall budget, and the frequency with which an item is purchased, are good
proxies for K.
Dispersion for ￿Cheap￿versus ￿Expensive￿Items
37Stigler (1961) provides casual evidence in support of his ￿rst hypothesis￿ that dispersion is lower
for items that account for a large expenditure share of a searcher￿ s consumption bundle (￿expensive
items￿ ) than those that account for a smaller expenditure share (￿cheap items￿ ). Government coal
purchases are a small percentage of the overall government budget, while a household￿ s expenditures
on an automobile comprise (in 1961 as well as today) a much larger percentage of its overall budget.
Stigler obtained di⁄erent sellers￿prices for two homogeneous products ￿ anthracite-grade coal to
be sold to the government, and an automobile to be sold to a household. Prices for anthracite coal
ranged from $15.46 to $18.92, with an average price of $16.90 and a standard deviation of $1.15.
Prices for the automobile (based on what Stigler called ￿an average amount of higgling￿ ) ranged
from $2,350 to $2,515, with an average price of $2,436 and standard deviation of $42. Stigler￿ s
data thus tend to support his ￿rst conjecture: If one calculates the implied coe¢ cient of variation
based on Stigler￿ s ￿gures, the coe¢ cient of variation for coal (which makes up a small percentage
of the government￿ s budget) is 14.7 percent, while that for an automobile (which makes up a large
percentage of a household￿ s budget) is 1.7 percent.
Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) observe a similar pattern in a cross-section of consumer
products sold in Boston in the 1970s. They obtain the following regression result regressing the
sample (log) standard deviation of prices for a given item on the sample (log) mean price for the
same item.
ln￿ = ￿1:517 + 0:892lnE [p] (14)
Straightforward manipulation of equation (14) reveals that a 1 percent increase in the mean price of
an item decreases the coe¢ cient of variation by 10.8 percent. Thus, the Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser
data also suggest that, empirically, the coe¢ cient of variation is lower for more expensive items
than cheaper items. However, equation (14) also highlights that the relationship depends crucially
on the measure of price dispersion used: If one were to use the standard deviation to measure price
dispersion, equation (14) implies that a one percent increase in the mean price of a product leads
to a 0.892 percent increase in dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation.
A number of other authors have reported similar patterns in online and o› ine markets, both
in the US and in Europe for products ranging from consumer sundries, electronic products, and
gasoline; cf. Marvel (1976), Carlson and Pescatrice (1980), Clay and Tay (2001), Scholten and
Smith (2002), Johnson (2002), Gatti and Kattuman (2003), and Aalto-Set￿l￿ (2003). More re-
cently, Eckard (2004) compares price dispersion for staple products in 1901 and 2001, and reports
coe¢ cients of variation in 2001 that are almost twice those based on data from 1901. Eckard argues
38that one reason for the increased dispersion is that his sample consists of staple items (such as sugar
and baking powder) that accounted for a much larger share of household budgets in 1901 than in
2001.
Dispersion and Purchase Frequency
In his second hypothesis, Stigler argues that in markets where there are more repetitive or
experienced buyers, the greater is the amount of e⁄ective search. Unfortunately, it is di¢ cult
to directly test this hypotheses, since in most markets there is not a direct (objective) measure
of ￿buyer experience￿or ￿purchase frequency￿to use in examining its impact on levels of price
dispersion. A number of the studies mentioned above, however, provide casual evidence that
purchase frequency impacts the level of price dispersion (cf. Carlson and Pescatrice, 1980; Pratt,
Wise, and Zeckhauser, 1979).
Sorensen (2000), however, has provided a very ￿clean￿ and elegant test of Stigler￿ s second
hypothesis. His analysis is based on data from the market for prescription drugs. The unique
aspect of this market is that purchase frequency￿ the typical dosage and duration of therapy
for a given prescription drug￿ may be objectively measured. A consumers￿bene￿t per search is
clearly highest for frequently purchased drugs, and, Sorensen argues, this should lead to greater
search and lower price dispersion. His empirical analysis identi￿es a strong inverse relationship
between purchase frequency and price dispersion. For example, after controlling other factors
(which together explain about one-third of the variation in prices), Sorensen ￿nds that the price
range for a drug that must be purchased monthly is about 30 percent lower than if it were a one-time
therapy. Importantly, Sorensen shows that the results are qualitatively similar when alternative
measures of price dispersion (such as the standard deviation) are used.
3.2.2 Dispersion and the ￿Cost￿of Search
Researchers studying the empirical relationship between search costs and price dispersion have faced
obstacles similar to those of researchers focusing on the bene￿t side of the search equation. First,
the predicted impact of search costs on levels of dispersion depends not only on the model, but
also on the metric used for measuring dispersion. Second, search costs are generally unobservable.
Some of the more in￿ uential papers in the area are ones that have devised innovative methods of
dealing with these problems.
One important example is Brown and Goolsbee (2002). Their starting point is the Stahl (1989)
model of equilibrium price dispersion, which as we noted in Section 2, predicts that price dispersion
39is initially an increasing function of the fraction of ￿shoppers￿who enjoy zero search costs, but after
a threshold, is a decreasing function of the fraction of shoppers. Brown and Goolsbee point out that
the Stahl model closely matches the market for term-life insurance during the 1992-1997 period.
Consumers who did not have an Internet connection arguably had to search sequentially to obtain
price quotes from di⁄erent insurance agents, while those with Internet access could use websites
such as Quickquote.com to ￿costlessly￿identify the company o⁄ering the lowest annual premium.
In their data, variation in the fraction of ￿shoppers￿(those who research insurance online) stems
not only from the general rise in Internet penetration during the 1990s, but more importantly, from
variation in the growth rates in Internet usage across di⁄erent groups of policyholders. Brown and
Goolsbee regress the standard deviation in residuals (obtained from a price regression that controls
for observable characteristics of people and policy types) on a cubic function of their proxy for the
fraction of ￿shoppers.￿Consistent with the prediction of the Stahl model, price dispersion initially
rises as the fraction of shoppers increases, but starts to decline once the fraction of consumers
researching insurance online exceeds about 5 percent.
A similar approach is implicit in a number of papers that have compared levels of dispersion
in online versus o› ine markets (cf. Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Carlton and Chevalier, 2001;
Ancarani and Shankar, 2004; and Scholten and Smith, 2002.) The basic premise is that search costs
are lower in online (search entails clicks) versus o› ine markets (search entails travel costs).20 In
general, since di⁄erent search models make di⁄erent predictions about the impact of reductions in
search costs on levels of price dispersion, it is not too surprising that the ￿ndings of this literature
are decidedly mixed; for some products, dispersion is lower in online markets; for other products,
dispersion is actually higher online.21
Along these same lines, a number of studies compare average prices in online versus o› ine
markets. The idea is that search costs are lower online, thus a⁄ecting not only the range or
variance in prices, but also the mean price (and hence the coe¢ cient of variation through both the
20The view that online search is either more prevalent or cheaper than o› ine search is a matter of some debate;
see, for instance, Adamic and Huberman (2001), Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, and Lohse (2004). Bakos (1997) was
among the ￿rst to advance a theoretical argument that when the cost of price information is close to zero, equilibrium
price is close to marginal cost. More recently, however, Harrington (2001) has argued that Bakos￿results are ￿ awed.
Finally, the Internet itself also o⁄ers opportunities for obfuscation (see Ellison and Ellison (2004)) or unobserved lack
of inventories (see Arnold & Saliba (2002)) that can raise search and/or transactions costs relative to o› ine markets.
21One may speculate that once shipping costs are accounted for, price dispersion online vanishes. This is not the
case; cf. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2002); Ancarani and Shankar (2004); Brynjolfsson, Dick and Smith (2004);
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000); Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001); Dinlersoz and Li (2005).
40mean and variance). Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso (2001) ￿nd that prices are lower in
online markets for automobiles. Consumers who purchase a car through the Internet referral service
Autobytel.com reduce their purchase price by approximately 2.2 percent. A potentially confounding
explanation for this price di⁄erence is that the consumers who choose to shop online may also
be skilled ￿higglers,￿to use Stigler￿ s phrase and thus the price di⁄erence might purely re￿ ect a
di⁄erence in the negotiating skills of consumers across the two channels. Interestingly, Zettelmeyer,
Scott-Morton and Silva-Risso (2004) provide evidence that this is not the case: consumers who
purchase automobiles online are not typically those who negotiate well in the traditional channel.
There are a number of other studies, however, that ￿nd equal or higher prices online (cf. Clemons,
Hann and Hitt (2002); Bailey (1998); Goolsbee (2001); Clay, et al. (2003); Erevelles, Rolland and
Srinivasan (2001)). Further studies distinguish price levels depending on whether the retailer is a
solely online or ￿multichannel￿(cf. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) and; Tang and Xing (2001)).
An alternative approach is to ￿recover￿search costs using structural parameters from a par-
ticular model of price dispersion. For example, Hong and Shum (forthcoming) obtain search costs
estimates using restrictions imposed by theoretical search models and assuming that observed price
dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon arising from heterogeneous consumer search costs. Their
estimation technique is applied to online price data on four economics and statistics textbooks.
They obtain search cost estimates ranging from $1.31 to $29.40 for these items. A similar approach
can be used in clearinghouse models. Villas-Boas (1995) uses the theoretical density function im-
plied by the Varian (1980) clearinghouse model to obtain estimates of the number of shoppers in
the o› ine co⁄ee and saltine cracker markets. More recently, Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan
(2005) used a theoretical clearinghouse model as the basis for estimating the fraction of ￿shop-
pers￿in an online market for PDAs in the UK. Their results suggest that about 13 percent of the
consumers in this market are shoppers.
3.2.3 Dispersion and the Number of Sellers
The oligopoly models presented in Section 2 reveal that equilibrium distributions of prices, and
hence levels of dispersion, vary with the number of sellers competing in the market. The direction
in which prices move as a consequence of a change in the number of sellers is, however, model speci￿c,
as we saw in the Varian and Rosenthal models. Thus, examining the relationship between the price
dispersion and the number of competing sellers not only provides a test of whether informational
factors play a role in generating observed price dispersion, but also in making distinctions among
41the various theory models.
For instance, Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004a) examine the theoretical and empirical rela-
tionship between the number of competitors and levels of price dispersion in clearinghouse models.
They show that the theoretical relationship between number of competitors and the level of price
dispersion in clearinghouse models is, in general, ambiguous, due to competing ￿order statistic￿
and ￿strategic￿e⁄ects. Through a calibration displayed in Figure 2, they show that the impact of
the number of sellers on price dispersion depends on the variant of the model. As the ￿gure shows,
in the Varian model (where ￿rms￿information transmission costs do not drive price dispersion),
the expected gap between the two lowest prices is initially increasing in the number of sellers, and
then declines. In contrast, in the Baye and Morgan model (where ￿rms￿information transmission
costs are the main driver of price dispersion), the expected gap is monotonically decreasing in the
number of ￿rms. Based on online data from a popular price comparison site for consumer elec-
tronics products, and controlling for other factors contributing to price dispersion, they ￿nd an
inverse relation between the gap and the number of online sellers. This relationship is depicted as
the dotted ￿observed￿line in Figure 2. As the ￿gure reveals, the non-monotonicity predicted by
the Varian model, as well as the relatively ￿ at relationship between the gap and number of ￿rms
predicted in the calibrated version of the Rosenthal model, is absent in the data. Speci￿cally, in
markets served by between two and four ￿rms, the average gap (as a percentage of the lowest price)
is about 14 percent. The average percentage gap falls to about 3 percent in markets with ￿ve to
ten ￿rms, and is less than one percent in markets with more than 10 ￿rms.
More broadly, several empirical papers have suggested that the amount of price dispersion
observed in the market depends on various measures of the numbers of competitors. Marvel (1976)
reports that an increase in the number of competitors (measured by the ln(HHI)) reduces the range
in the price of gasoline. Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004) study the structural determinants of
price dispersion in the retail gasoline industry in four geographic locations, and provide empirical
evidence that, controlling for station-level characteristics, an increase in station density decreases
both price levels and price dispersion.22 Borenstein and Rose (1994) investigate the relationship
between dispersion among airfares and the number of competitors or ￿ ight density. They ￿nd that
dispersion in fares increases on routes with lower ￿ ight density or more competition. Thus, there
is evidence that the number of sellers matters for price dispersion.
22See also Png and Reitman (1994).
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Varian (1980) was the ￿rst to distinguish between what he referred to as ￿spatial￿and ￿temporal￿
price dispersion. Under spatial price dispersion, di⁄erent ￿rms charge di⁄erent prices at any point
in time, but a ￿rm￿ s position in the distribution of prices does not change over time. Absent random
cost shocks, spatial price dispersion arises in the Reinganum, MacMinn, and Spulber models. In
contrast, with temporal price dispersion, ￿rms charge di⁄erent prices at each point in time, but
their position in the distribution of prices changes over time. Temporal price dispersion arises
in the general clearinghouse model (and various special cases) as well as in the Burdett and Judd
model. Varian critiques models of spatial price dispersion, arguing that if consumers can learn from
experience that some ￿rms persistently o⁄er lower prices than other ￿rms, then models of spatial
price dispersion suggest a ￿convergence hypothesis￿ : price dispersion should diminish over time due
to the positive correlation in successive prices (to use Stigler￿ s terminology) and cumulative search
information. This has led to a number of studies that examine whether there is any evidence for the
convergence hypothesis and whether the temporal price dispersion predicted by the clearinghouse
models is, in fact, present in the data.
Using monthly store-level price data from Israel, and after controlling for observed and un-
observed product heterogeneities, Lach (2002) ￿nds some evidence of temporal price dispersion.
Lach estimates month-to-month transitions among quartiles by ￿rms; that is, the probability that
a ￿rm o⁄ering a price in a given quartile at the start of the month is still o⁄ering a price in the
same quartile at the end of the month. His estimates suggest that the probability of remaining in
the same quartile is 78 percent for ￿rms selling refrigerators and 71 percent for ￿rms selling ￿ our.
These probabilities are somewhat lower for ￿rms selling chicken (51 percent) and co⁄ee (43 per-
cent). When the transition period is extended to six months instead of one month, the probability
of remaining in the same quartile is considerably lower￿ falling to around 30-35 percent.
Roberts and Supina (2000) suggest that structural di⁄erences in ￿rms￿ costs account for a
considerable portion of price dispersion in the o› ine sector￿ as predicted by a variety of search-
theoretic models. Using plant-level US Census data, they ￿nd some evidence for price persistence.
The evidence is strongest in the tails of the distribution: high-price ￿rms tend to persistently charge
high prices, and low-price ￿rms tends to persistently charge low prices. A variety of other studies
also suggest that heterogeneities either across ￿rms or across markets impact price dispersion in
online markets (cf. Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson (1999); Clay, Krishnan and Wol⁄(2001); Smith
43and Brynjolfsson (2001); Chen and Hitt (2002); Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002); and Brynjolfsson,
Dick and Smith (2004)). In all cases, however, even after controlling for various heterogeneities,
economically signi￿cant levels of price dispersion remain.
There is also evidence that online prices exhibit temporal price dispersion. For instance, Baye,
Morgan and Scholten (2004b) examine turnover of the identity of the low-price and high-price ￿rms
using a dataset consisting of 36 popular consumer electronics products sold over a 19-month period.
They ￿nd considerable evidence for month-to-month changes in the identity of the low-price ￿rms,
but some evidence of persistence in the identity of high-priced ￿rms. Similarly, Iyer and Pazgal
(2003) collect bi-weekly price data on music CDs, movie videos and books from ￿ve price comparison
sites: MySimon, BottomDollar, EvenBetter, Bsilly and Pricescan during the period April-October
2000 and ￿nd empirical results suggesting that no single ￿rm consistently charges the low price.
Finally, Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004a) examine the convergence hypothesis of price dis-
persion using a dataset consisting of over four million daily price observations for over one thousand
consumer electronics products sold on a popular Internet price comparison site over an eight month
period. Even allowing for a nonlinear relationship between observed price dispersion and time, they
￿nd no evidence for the convergence hypothesis in this market￿ the level of price dispersion re-
mained stable over the period.
3.3 Concluding Remarks: Empirics
We conclude with four simple observations.
1. As is evident from the studies highlighted in Table 1, price dispersion is ubiquitous and
persistent. Regardless of the particular product (tinplate cans or PDAs), the venue in which
they are sold (online or o› ine, in the US or abroad), or the time period (1901 or 2005), the
inescapable conclusion from the empirical literature is a validation of Stigler￿ s and Varian￿ s
initial observations: Information remains a valuable resource, and the law of one price is still
no law at all.
2. Theory is useful for understanding dispersion data, and dispersion data is useful for discrim-
inating among alternative theoretical models.
3. The relationship between price dispersion and economic primitives is often sensitive to the
measure of price dispersion used.
444. Despite the widespread adoption of inventions such as the automobile, the telephone, televi-
sion, and the Internet, price dispersion is still the rule rather than the exception in homoge-
neous product markets. Reductions in information costs over the past century have neither
reduced nor eliminated the levels of price dispersion observed in homogeneous product mar-
kets.
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Bailey (1998) 1997 Books  13.2% Standard Deviation
Books 10.4% Standard  Deviation
Compact Discs  17.6% Standard Deviation
Compact Discs  11.0% Standard Deviation
Software 7.1% Standard  Deviation
Software 8.1% Standard  Deviation
Borenstein and Rose (1994) 1986 U.S. Airline  0.018 - 0.416 Gini coefficient
Carlson and Pescatrice (1980) 1976 Consumer Sundries 3.3% - 41.4% Coefficient of Variation
Eckard (2004) 1901 - 2001 Baking Powder, Sugar, Salt -- 1901  3.1% - 10.1% Coefficient of Variation
Baking Powder, Sugar, Salt -- 2001  0.0% - 13.4% Coefficient of Variation
Friberg, Ganslandt and Sandstrom 
(2001)
1999 Books  $54.00 - $122.00 Range
Books  $21.94 - $76.20 Standard Deviation
Compact Discs  $20.00 - $40.00 Range
Compact Discs  $12.91 - $23.86 Standard Deviation
Books (Sweden) $19.00 - $58.00 Range
Compact Discs (Sweden) $21.00 - $46.00 Range
Lach (2002) 1993 - 1996 Refrigerator (Israel) 4.9% Coefficient of Variation
Chicken, Flour, Coffee (Israel) 11.4% - 19.7% Coefficient of Variation
Marvel (1976) 1964 - 1971 Regular Gasoline  $0.048 Range
Regular Gasoline  $0.015 Standard Deviation
Premium Gasoline  $0.048 Range
Premium Gasoline  $0.017 Standard Deviation
Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser 
(1979)
1975 Various Products and Services  4.4% - 71.4% Coefficient of Variation
Various Products and Services  11.0% - 567.0% Range
Various Products and Services  7.2% - 200.0% Value of Information
Roberts and Supina (2000) 1963 - 1987 Wood Products  13.8% - 90.2% Coefficient of Variation
Fabrics  18.8% - 78.1% Coefficient of Variation
Coffee  14.3% - 25.1% Coefficient of Variation
Ready-Mixed Concrete  13.2% - 37.2% Coefficient of Variation
Newsprint  4.5% - 8.2% Coefficient of Variation
Gasoline  6.2% - 11.8% Coefficient of Variation
Tinplate Steel Cans  25.0% - 31.0% Coefficient of Variation
Pan Bread  26.0% - 49.6% Coefficient of Variation
Corrugated Shipping Containers  21.8% - 39.6% Coefficient of Variation
Scholten and Smith (2002) 1976 - 2000 Consumer Sundries -- 1976  3.3% - 41.4% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Sundries -- 2000  1.6% - 42.0% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Sundries -- 2000   5.7% - 28.4% Coefficient of Variation
Sorensen (2000) 1998 Prescription Drugs  $13.17 Range
Prescription Drugs  22.0% Coefficient of Variation
Stigler (1961) 1953 Anthracite Coal  $3.46 Range
Anthracite Coal  $1.15 Standard Deviation
1959 Identical Automobiles  $165.00 Range
Identical Automobiles  $42.00 Standard Deviation
Villas-Boas (1995) 1985 - 1987 Coffee  21.5% Coefficient of Variation
1 Table 1a includes
 studies comparing offline and online price dispersion.Table 1b: Measures of Price Dispersion Reported in the Literature in Online Markets Only






Ancarani and Shankar (2004) 2002 Books (Italy) €4.26 - €4.84 Standard Deviation
Books (Italy) €20.00 - €22.88 Range
Compact Discs (Italy) €2.29 - €2.79 Standard Deviation
Compact Discs (Italy) €11.82 - €14.75 Range
Arbatskaya and Baye 
(Forthcoming)
1998 Mortgage Interest Rates  > 0.25  Range
Arnold and Saliba (2002) 2001 Textbooks  10.7% - 52.6% Range
Textbooks  3.5% - 10.0% Coefficient of Variation
Textbooks  0.2% - 12.5% Price gap
Baye, Morgan and Scholten 
(2003)
2000 - 2001 Consumer Electronics  $123.88 - $143.15 Range
Baye, Morgan and Scholten 
(2004a)
2000 - 2001 Consumer Electronics  9.1% - 9.7% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics  3.79% - 5.38% Gap
Baye, Morgan and Scholten 
(2004b)
1999 - 2001 Consumer Electronics  57.4% Range
Consumer Electronics  12.5% Coefficient of Variation
Baylis and Perloff (2002) 1999 Camera  $342.00 Range
Scanner $106.00 Range
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) 1998-1999 Books  33.0% Range
Compact Discs  25.0% Range
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) 2001 Books  8.1% - 12.3% Range
Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff (2001) 1999 - 2000 Books  27.7% Coefficient of Variation
Books $7.62 Range
Clay, Krishnan, Wolff and 
Fernandes (2003)
1999 Books  10.0% - 18.0% Coefficient of Variation
Clemons, Hann and Hitt (2002) Travel  $8.03 - $13.40 Range
Ellison and Ellison (2004) 2000 - 2001 Memory Modules  5.9% - 29.0% Range
Gatti and Kattuman (2003) 2002 Consumer Electronics (France) 3.0% - 15.3% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (Italy) 4.3% - 14.2% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (Netherlands) 5.6% - 20.4% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (Spain) 2.2% - 13.3% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (Sweden) 6.6% - 14.0% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (UK) 3.5% - 16.2% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (Denmark) 6.3% - 20.2% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics (France) 7.8% - 47.4% Range
Consumer Electronics (Italy) 9.3% - 27.8% Range
Consumer Electronics (Netherlands) 8.9% - 54.6% Range
Consumer Electronics (Spain) 3.8% - 32.4% Range
Consumer Electronics (Sweden) 16.4% - 50.4% RangeConsumer Electronics (UK) 7.0% - 54.9% Range
Consumer Electronics (Denmark) 12.8% - 42.9% Range
Consumer Electronics (France) 1.6% - 16.1% Gap
Consumer Electronics (Italy) 3.6% - 13.7% Gap
Consumer Electronics (Netherlands) 8.9% - 34.6% Gap
Consumer Electronics (Spain) 3.7% - 18.0% Gap
Consumer Electronics (Sweden) 5.9% - 15.6% Gap
Consumer Electronics (UK) 2.5% - 14.5% Gap
Consumer Electronics (Denmark) 3.6% - 31.9% Gap
Hong and Shum (Forthcoming) 2002 Books  $8.19 - 27.05 Range
Books  6.2% - 8.5% Coefficient of Variation
Janssen, Moraga-Gonzalez and 
Wildenbeest (2005)
2004 Market for Keyboards  $6.50 - $91.67 Range
Market for Keyboards  8.0% - 52.0% Coefficient of Variation
Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 
(2002)
2000 Books  15.0% Coefficient of Variation
Compact Discs  15.4% Coefficient of Variation
DVDs  12.7% Coefficient of Variation
PDAs  11.8% Coefficient of Variation
Software  11.7% Coefficient of Variation
Consumer Electronics  9.6% Coefficient of Variation
Pan, Shankar and Ratchford 
(2003)
2000 - 2003 Consumer Electronics and Books  9.8% - 11.7% Coefficient of Variation
Books  33.3% - 48.9% Range
Compact Discs  22.2% - 51.0% Range
DVDs  30.7% - 43.7% Range
Computers  15.0% - 34.4% Range
Software  19.0% - 35.6% Range
Consumer Electronics  22.1% - 45.7% Range
Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) 1999 Books  28.0% - 33.0% Value of Information
Books  $6.29 - $10.51 Standard Deviation